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Abstract
Interest in the role of large urban development (LUD) projects in regeneration efforts of cities has risen in recent years.
Studies of their planning process have often focused on global cities, examining challenges associated with their joint
(public–private) governance structure, as well as those emanating from the need to balance local and global needs and
interests. With few exceptions, the ways in which these projects fit in with metropolitan aspirations of small and medium
cities were largely overlooked. In this article, we explore how a large-scale project was used by local authorities to re-
position a secondary city as a sub-metropolitan center. Using the case of the 1000-District (Mitcham HaElef ) in the Israeli
city of Rishon-Lezion, it argues that while the project was originally designed to resolve the city’s scarce employment
problem, it was gradually used to endow it with higher-order urban qualities, re-situating it as a sub-metropolitan center
in the Tel-Aviv area. To support our argument, we focus on the project’s housing and employment components, including
changes they were subjected to along the planning process, as well as themarketing campaign, which sought to re-present
the city as a viable sub-metropolitan alternative. Drawing on qualitative methods, including personal interviews and con-
tent analysis, the article illustrates how one city’s large project is instrumentalized to attain metro-scale objectives. In so
doing, it contributes to a nuanced understanding of the complexity of LUD planning, its stated objectives at various scales,
and implications for actors in and beyond metropolitan jurisdictions.
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1. Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a considerable
surge in the number and scope of large urban de-
velopment (LUD) projects (Gualini & Majoor, 2007;
Salet, 2008; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodriguez, 2002).
Alternately referred to as strategic urban (Salet, 2006) or
mega (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2004) projects, they were
loosely-defined as massive and expensive projects of
(re)-development, whose construction may take a num-
ber of years and involve major changes in land use
(Fainstein, 2008). A salient manifestation of the “new
urban policy,” which saw redistributive policies giving
way to market-oriented approaches to economic devel-
opment and competitiveness of cities (Gualini & Majoor,
2007), mega projects have spread quickly from North
America and Western Europe to South-East Asian, Arab,
and Latin American cities (Barthel, 2010; Dogan& Stupar,
2017; Paling, 2012; Shatkin, 2008), resulting in “global
convergence” (Hwang, 2014).
For cities, foreseen physical, economic and cultural
impacts have been keymotivations for embarking on am-
Urban Planning, 2019, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 18–30 18
bitious, large-scale projects. Projects are expected to gar-
ner urban competitiveness by producing inter alia larger
stocks of service jobs, more aesthetically pleasing phys-
ical environment and a culturally positive urban image.
From a scalar perspective, these impacts were seen as
instrumental for re-positioning cities within regional, na-
tional or global urban hierarchies (Dogan & Stupar, 2017;
Lehrer & Laidley, 2008; Xu & Yeh, 2005). However, rel-
atively little attention was thus far paid to the impact
of projects at the metropolitan level. Given that inter-
urban competition is (also) waged between cities that
are part of the same metro area, mega projects could
well serve as a means for city-repositioning within it.
This is particularly relevant in small countries, whose ur-
ban landscape is dominated by a handful of large cities
which constitute the core of the metropolitan area and
are surrounded bymultiple smaller, non-core cities. Such
is the case of Israel, where the four metropolitan core
cities (Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Beer-Sheva) are
surrounded by multiple secondary cities. Especially in
Tel-Aviv, the past two decades have seen secondary, non-
core cities implementing urban policies designated to
improve their strategic position within—and beyond—
the metro area. While some, like Holon, opted for an
all-out re-branding campaign (Herstein & Jaffe, 2008),
others—notably Bat-Yam—implemented a series of cul-
tural mega-events to reverse its negative image and re-
inforce its competitiveness vis-a-vis other cities, in and
beyond metropolitan boundaries (Eizenberg & Cohen,
2015). As the current study demonstrates, Rishon-Lezion
(thereafter Rishon), the second largest city in the Tel-Aviv
area, has instrumentalized a large-scale urban project
to bolster its status and re-position itself inside its
metropolitan hierarchy.
This article aims to examine how the planning of
a large-scale urban development project promotes the
metropolitan aspirations of a secondary, non-core city.
Drawing on the 1000-District (Mitcham HaElef ) project
in Rishon, it shows how a project that was conceived
with the aim of promoting distinct local (urban) needs,
namely enhance the stock of urban jobs, became a tool
for its re-positioning within the urban hierarchy of the
greater Tel-Aviv metropolitan area. Specifically, it shows
how—in the course of planning—the project has shifted
from a limited scheme aimed at spurring urban em-
ployment to an ambitious initiative geared towards re-
placing Rishon as a sub-metropolitan (commercial and
residential) center, that is able to compete with other
secondary cities in the area as well as the core city itself.
The remainder of the article consists of four parts.
Following a brief conceptual section on LUD projects, in-
cluding challenges associated with its planning process,
it contextualizes our case within broader urban planning
trajectories in contemporary Israel. The third section an-
alyzes the dimensions of employment and housing in
the project’s planning process, including the finalmarket-
ing phase, exemplifying how a coalition of interests was
formed that sought to use it for the purpose ofmetropoli-
tan re-positioning. The article concludes by discussing
its main contributions and, where possible, outlines av-
enues of future research about the metropolitan effects
of LUD.
2. Theoretical Background
In the last two decades, large-scale urban projects have
become strategically important tools for city-(re) devel-
opment. Traditionalmega projectswere used to describe
“large-scale capital investments focused on a single pur-
pose, particularly…transportation networks and power
facilities” (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008, p. 788). However,
in the middle part of the century (roughly from the
1930s to 1970), the term was extended to include high-
ways, airports, train stations and even social housing
projects. These were state-led and delivered, reflecting
the Keynesian-inspired interventionist approach of the
Fordist state that was dominant in Europe (Moulaert,
Salin, & Werquin, 2001).
By the late 1980s, as economic neo-liberalizationwas
unfolding, a ‘new’ type ofmega projects emerged, which
as Home (1990, p. 119) notes, included “huge private
sector commercial development incorporating all kinds
of land-use usually associated with a central business
district.” Facilitated by deregulatory state policies and
increasing market demand, the new projects soon pro-
liferated to suburban and exurban sections of mostly,
Northern cities. Over time, projects have taken different
governance structures, financing techniques and land
uses (Olds, 2001). In an oft-cited symposium, Orueta and
Fainstein (2009) argue that contemporarymega-projects
take two main forms; the first is “based on the con-
struction of a huge edifice with strong symbolic signifi-
cance” (e.g., flagshipmuseums), and the second “a larger
scheme with complex contents (mixed residential uses,
service industries, shared facilities, new transport facili-
ties” (Orueta & Fainstein, 2009, p. 760). They argue that
the new generation of mega-projects refer to schemes
of waterfront regeneration (see Avni & Teschner, 2019),
(re)development of manufacturing zones, construction
of transport infrastructure or (re)construction of urban
districts to meet the residential and commercial tastes
of upper, middle-class groups. In line with this broad
typology, Fainstein (2008, p. 768) loosely-defines mega
projects as “costly scheme[s] for development of a con-
tiguous area, requiring new construction and/or substan-
tial rehabilitation,” which “may take a number of years”
to complete and “always include a transformation of land
uses” (Fainstein, 2008, p. 768).
While earlier studies examinedmega-projects as win-
win solutions for cities seeking to re-bound fromdecades
of de-industrialization and social decay (Loftman &
Nevin, 1995), more recent accounts have taken a
more critical approach (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2004).
Denigrated for their neoliberal logic, which helps turn
entire city sections into highly regulated and privatized
spaces of for the upper-middle classes, large urban
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projects are seen as potentially contributing to new elite
formations, residential displacement, and higher levels
of social polarization (Gellert & Lynch, 2003; Moulaert
et al., 2001). Other critics called attention to the demo-
cratic deficit of such projects (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly,
& Schneider, 2013), arguing that despite their nominally
mixed structure of governance, in practice they sidestep
social justice considerations, and strain public resources
in the name of securing predominantly private gains
(Siemiatycki, Rees, Ng, & Rahi, 2003). As Gualini and
Majoor (2007) concluded a decade ago, “projects that
share in a market-oriented competition rhetoric are of-
ten mainly publicly led and highly vulnerable with regard
to shifting market interests, putting the burdens of finan-
cial investments and risks largely on urban governments”
(Gualini & Majoor, 2007, p. 298).
Though projects are conceived to resolve particu-
lar local needs, like promoting physical rehabilitation
of abandoned urban industrial zones left from the old
zoning scheme, their impacts are typically felt at dif-
ferent scales. Light rail transit systems effect commut-
ing choices of residents from adjacent cities (van Wee
& Rietveld, 2013), and flagship museums draw patrons
from distant parts of the region (Hamnett & Shoval,
2003; Loftman & Nevin, 1995), thus contributing to ur-
ban competitiveness. Such impacts are seen as instru-
mental to the re-positioning of cities within regional, na-
tional (inter-metropolitan) or global urban hierarchies.
Xu and Yeh (2005), for example, examine how the provin-
cial Chinese city of Guanzhou utilized mega projects to
enhance its competitiveness vis-à-vis other cities in the
region, and Dogan and Stupar (2017) showed how three
of Istanbul’s recent projects are aligned with develop-
ment goals at the national scale, spelt out in the Turkish
State’s Vision 2023. Drawing on the case of Toronto,
Lehrer and Laidley (2008) demonstrate how its large-
scale water redevelopment project was essential to gen-
erating economic activities and “establish the interna-
tional presence of the city and its revitalization” (Lehrer
& Laidley, 2008, p. 789). In some cases, though, mega
projects that aimed to promote positive image at home
and abroad were bound up with massive corruption and
cost overruns (Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2014).
In contrast, and despite a surge of interest in the
metropolitan scale and its economic development strate-
gies (Kennedy, 2013; Salet, 2007), relatively little atten-
tion was so far paid to the ways in which mega projects
are used in intra-metropolitan competition. Given that
inter-urban competition is sometimes waged between
adjacent cities in the same urban agglomeration, mega
projects could well serve some of them for metropoli-
tan re-positioning. This is particularly true in small and
densely populated countries, whose urban landscape is
dominated by a handful of large cities, which constitute
the core of the metropolitan area and are surrounded
by multiple smaller, non-core cities. Such is the case of
Israel, where the four metropolitan core cities—Beer-
Sheva, Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv—are surrounded
by multiple secondary cities (Shachar, 1998). Especially
in Tel-Aviv, its principal metropolitan node (Razin &
Charney, 2015), the past three decades have seen sec-
ondary, non-core cities implementing urban policies des-
ignated to improve their strategic position within—and
beyond—the metro area. While some, like Holon, opted
for an all-out re-branding campaign (Herstein & Jaffe,
2008), others—notably Bat-Yam, implemented a series
of cultural mega-events to reverse its territorial stigmati-
zation (Cohen, 2013), and reinforce its competitiveness
vis-à-vis other cities, in and beyond metropolitan bound-
aries (Eizenberg & Cohen, 2015).
Recent years have seen a small but growing num-
ber of secondary Israeli cities making plans for costly,
mixed-use mega-projects that aim to (re)develop a con-
tiguous area byways of newmassive construction and/or
substantial (brownfield) redevelopment. Salient exam-
ples, some of which are still subject to final approval
by planning authorities, include Tel-HaShomer (Ramat-
Gan), Sirkin (Petach-Tikva), Techelet Beach (Herzeliya),
and Western Quarter (Lod). It should be noted that sev-
eral of these mega projects are implemented on (ur-
ban) land recently evacuated by the Israeli military. Yet,
with few exceptions, notably Jaffa’s waterfront redevel-
opment project (Avni, 2017), their planning trajectories
have been understudied. Missing in particular are ac-
counts that examine how secondary cities design, plan
and instrumentalize projects to bolster their status and
re-position themselves within the metropolitan urban
hierarchy. The 1000-District project in Rishon makes a
good case through which to explore these issues.
3. Methods
Our analysis focuses on the project’s planning process
that had taken place between 2009 and 2018. It should
be noted that its implementation phase, which began
more recently, is beyond the scope of the article and
so we are unable to assess whether it has attained its
states objectives. To analyze planning, we employed two
primary methods of inquiry.
First, content analysis of primary and secondary
materials pertaining to the planning process (see
Appendix). A common technique of qualitative data
analysis (Mayring, 2004), content analysis allows a sys-
tematic, theme-based examination of data in social con-
texts and is especially suitable for geographical studies
because it facilitates the testing of existing categories or
concepts in new social environments. Two types of mate-
rials were analyzed. First, planning documents produced
by pertinent agencies (e.g., local and District Planning
committees) and protocols of meetings held by offi-
cial bodies involved in the planning process (e.g., City
Council, the Economic Company) were used, as well as
the official website of the project. These documents al-
lowed us to trace the official planning trajectory and
examine the different stances articulated by partners
with regards to the aims and outcomes of the project.
Urban Planning, 2019, Volume 4, Issue 4, Pages 18–30 20
Secondly, relevant articles and ads appearing in local and
national media outlets, usually in their electronic form
(e.g.,HaShikma Rishon, Ynet, TheMarker) were analyzed.
These complementary sources allowed us to go beyond
the official planning narrative and helped us construct a
sufficiently broad picture of the process.
A second primary methods of inquiry were the per-
sonal, semi-structured interviews conducted with se-
nior officials who were directly involved in the pro-
cess, including the chief architects, Deputy Director of
the City’s Planning Department, and the CEO of the
Economic Company (see Appendix). Interviewswere con-
ducted in their offices and lasted approximately one
hour. Interviewees were asked about their role and in-
volvement in the project, interactions with other part-
ners, the challenges faced during the planning process,
and how they were resolved. Data obtained through in-
terviews refined our understanding of the daily process
of negotiation between partners to the planning pro-
cess and shed important light on the motivations behind
changes that were introduced along the way. They were
then transcribed verbatim and content analyzed. In an-
alyzing interviews, we paid attention to how informants
conceive of the project itself, its stated objectives, and
role in Rishon’s metropolitan (re)-positioning.
4. The 1000-District: An Urban (Re)Development
Mega Project
Although urban renewal in Israel is hardly a new phe-
nomenon (for an excellent review of urban renewal poli-
cies through the late 1990s see Carmon, 1999), recent
years have seen a frenzy of new projects. Motivated by,
among other things, deteriorating conditions of apart-
ment buildings, steady rise in land values, and popula-
tion pressures, a plethora of cities have embarked on ur-
ban (re)development schemes in the past two decades.
Fueled by “a neoliberal offensive on land-use planning”
(Charney, 2017) and couched within a discourse of “cre-
ative destruction” (Fenster, 2019), renewal projects now
dot the landscape of dozens Israel cities. While most
are small-scale, single-use (residential) projects aimed
predominantly to increase local housing stocks, others
are significantly more ambitious, comprising of large-
scale (excess of 1000 dunams), mixed-use (residential,
commercial, and recreational) compounds. These mega-
projects are typically executed by a steering commit-
tee (Minhelet) comprising representatives of private and
public agencies. The Committee oversees a cumbersome
planning procedure that entails considerable changes to
the use of land, which often has numerous owners. This
complex governance structure and the need to alignmul-
tiple interests of urban, regional and national stakehold-
ers make projects a tumultuous process of negotiation.
Although the majority of projects are intended to
resolve specific local needs, like strengthening the ur-
ban economy or (re)aestheticizing a run-down neigh-
borhood, they are typically used to secure wider, trans-
urban objectives. These objectives are increasingly de-
fined in regional terms, reflecting as such the metropoli-
tan aspirations of the city. For instance, Holon’s new busi-
ness center, which reinvigorates the city’s partly vacant,
old industrial zone by adding an assortment of new land
uses, is promising to become “the logistical hinterland
of Tel-Aviv…thanks to its location at the heart of the
metropolitan area” (Hashikma Holon, 2019). Similarly,
boasting over three million square meters of commer-
cial, residential and office uses, Hertzliya’s new busi-
ness center promises to solidify the city’s position as “a
center of metropolitan employment” (see HR/2530 in
the Appendix).
The 1000-District (see Figure 1) shares many quali-
ties with large-scale projects mentioned above. Based
in Rishon, the fourth largest city in the country and the
second largest in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, it was
originally conceived as a solution to its dwindling em-
ployment base. Fast population growth since the 1990s
coupled with slow rates of job creation, led to a situa-
tion by which half of the local workforce was commut-
ing beyond city boundaries, primarily to Tel-Aviv. Thus,
whereas in 1990, 36% of residents were employed lo-
cally (see CBS5 and TMM 3/21 in the Appendix), in 2010,
only 31% did so (see CBS1 in the Appendix). Municipal
forecasts predicted that by 2030, approximately 80,000
additional jobs will be needed to increase the share
of locally employed residents to 45% (see RZ/2030 in
the Appendix).
Shortage of employment opportunities has long
been a problem for Rishon, yet few attempts have been
made to resolve it over the years. Only under Mayor Dov
Tzur has the city begun tackling the problem more sys-
tematically. Upon his election in 2008, the Mayor set a
vision of boosting urban employment to revive declining
urban tax revenues. Simultaneously, he vowed to com-
bat out-of-town commute, primarily to Tel-Aviv, and sig-
nificantly reduce the negative, socio-ecological impacts
associated with it. As the CEO of the city’s Economic
Development Corporation noted: “[The Mayor’s] main
concern was that more than half the…[working] popula-
tion drives to Tel-Aviv daily, generating traffic jams, noise,
pollution, [and] environmental damage” (PI1). Thus, it
was economic and socio-ecological challenges, both of
which adversely affecting the quality of urban life, that
stood at the heart of the Mayor’s new vision.
In line with his vision, in June 2009, the city issued a
bid for planning a new employment compound. Its objec-
tive was to constitute the city’s “main employment zone
of advanced industries, combined with financial services
and complementary uses” (see CH2 in the Appendix). In
September, it was announced that Yaad Architects had
won the bid. Their proposal, originally titled The Dune
Park, consisted of an urban development project occupy-
ing a large contiguous tract in the Southwestern part of
the city, owned co-jointly by the city andmultiple private
owners (it was about 1500 dunams, or 370 acres, compa-
rable to that of mega projects in major European cities,
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Figure 1. Tel-Aviv metropolitan area (A) and Rishon City (B). Source: Google Maps (2019); see also CBS3 in the Appendix.
like Zuidas in Amsterdam and 22@bcn in Barcelona; see
Majoor, 2008).
The original plan, which, as we show below, was
subject to various revisions, involved massive land use
changes that were needed to create a large-scale, mixed-
use (employment, residential, office, commercial, educa-
tional, and cultural) compound.
Planning began shortly thereafter, but the project
itself was approved by City Council only in 2016. The
reasons for the gap are twofold. First, bureaucracy com-
bined with legal objections, who were submitted by par-
ties to be potentially affected by the project, delayed
the process. Second, the land allocated for the project
was co-owned by the city (roughly half) and over one
thousand private individuals. It should be noted that a
co-owned land in this size is rare in Israel. Therefore,
most urbanmega projects are implemented on land that
is owned in its entirety by public (city/state) or private
agents. The city-approved plan was radically different
than that proposed by Yaad Architects seven years ear-
lier (see Table 1). Changes were particularly acute in the
housing and employment dimensions of the project. In
addition to considerable changes in the volume and com-
position of the residential component (i.e., apartments),
there was a significant add-on to the number of pro-
posed office space as well as number and types of fore-
seen jobs. These were to complement major commer-
cial and recreational uses (e.g., restaurants, hotels, re-
search labs and movie theaters) and substantial allot-
ment for open public space like urban parks. The plan
further stipulated that the project should be constructed
in close proximity to Rishon’s active train station and (fu-
ture) light rail stations, and major arteries, notably high-
ways 431, 4 and 20, which dissect the city (Figure 2).
Consequently, the grandiose project was described as
an “alive and kicking compound with 24/7 life solutions”
(see PI2 in the Appendix), which would offer residents
and visitors “an innovative, lively and engaging urban life
style” (1000muni, 2019).
To coordinate the arduous planning process, which
required the involvement of planning committees at
different scales (local, district and national), non-for-
profit organizations, private corporations and multi-
ple landowners, the city established a district ad-
ministration (Minhelet Mitcham; see CH14 in the
Appendix). As the next sections show, the administra-
tion orchestrated the local-turned-metropolitan urban
(re)development project.
5. Findings
Rishon’s ambitions of playing a more significant role at
themetropolitan scale preceded theproject. Indeed, one
of its current Masterplan’s key objectives is “ensuring
quality of life for city residents by taking advantage of its
locationwithin Tel-Aviv’smetropolitan area” (see RZ/203
in the Appendix). Hence, quite early in the planning pro-
cess it became clear that the project could be used to re-
alize its metropolitan objectives. Over time and through
a series of revisions in different realms, these objectives
gradually crystallized. In this section we focus on two
key dimensions, which were instrumental to the city’s
metropolitan strategy, namely employment and hous-
ing. In addition, we highlight the role of the marketing
campaign in ‘selling’ the project’s metropolitan qualities
through what we term ‘metrotalk.’
In the realm of employment, it was project location
and size, and type of jobs to be created in it, that be-
came strategically important. Location was a key consid-
eration from the outset.While the planning team initially
considered creating smaller number of jobs at each of
the city’s five industrial zones (Electra, Northeast, Ramat
Eliyahu, Sorek and Western), it was rejected in favor of
concentrating employment in one, new compound. One
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Figure 2. 1000-District mix-uses. Derived from CH5, CH6 and CH11 in the Appendix.
reason for this was the poor image of some of the exist-
ing zones as hubs of traditional industries, which offer
primarily blue-collar jobs. Electra industrial zone, for ex-
ample, primarily consists of small-scale carpentries, auto
shops, metal shops, and printing houses. Thus, concerns
about being associated with a dated zone, whose eco-
nomic value is relatively low and suffers poor infrastruc-
ture, including water, electricity and sewage, were com-
pounded by the fear of exacerbating urban congestions
alongmain roads leading tomost of them. The chosen lo-
cation, in proximity to current and future transportation
networks, including cross-metropolitan highways (4, 20
and 431) and railroads (both south/northwards) were in-
strumental to promoting the project as a major hub of
employment that is easily accessible from all parts of the
metropolitan area. Finally, the composition of landown-
ership in some zones was detrimental to the designation
of certain land uses that may not be commensurate with
the interests of private owners. The chosen location, in
contrast, which was co-owned by the city, facilitated a
quick designation of the land for more profitable uses.
As Mayor Tzur explained in a recent interview, imple-
menting the project in a new compound, outside exist-
ing industrial zones would be beneficial not only because
of the corporate tax it would generate, but also because
“[s]elling the land [to corporations] would [generate] a
lot of money for the city, between 2 and 3 billion NIS”
(Ynet Rishon, 2019).
The physical size, both absolute and relative, of the
project was also a sign for the metropolitan aspirations.
Absolutely, in line with the Mayor’s vision, the project
was meant to increase employment opportunities in the
city. However, while the masterplan projected that the
number of additional jobs needed to ensure urban eco-
nomic stability was 80,000, planners set the bar much
higher. Consequently, by 2013, the project was set to pro-
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vide more than double that number, nearly 190,000. Not
surprisingly, the surge was promoted aggressively by the
city, primarily the Mayor, because, as the chief planner
argued: “[H]e had a dream of making Rishon into a sub-
metropolitan employment provider, [and so he pushed
for] a large and powerful zone” (PI3). The Mayor’s vi-
sion, however, corresponded with that of the District
Planner, which conceived of Rishon in regional terms as
“a metropolitan primate city, that provides services be-
yond its residents and as such its economic dimensions
were weighted in relation to other [neighboring] cities
and it was found that it needs an improvement in the
project” (see RPI3 in the Appendix).
It should be noted, though, that Rishon’s grandiose
plans were not always well-received by neighboring
cities. Indeed, some of them expressed serious con-
cerns over its metropolitan aspirations and their poten-
tial repercussions. The objection of Bat-Yam, for exam-
ple, its northern neighbor, were particularly notewor-
thy. A struggling municipality, Bat-Yam claimed that the
project constitutes an “unfair competitor” to its own re-
newing business area and could potentially hamper its
ability to fully realize its economic potential (see RPI1
in the Appendix). In response to the objection, which
the court eventually rejected, the District Planner reiter-
ated Rishon’s aspirations, noting that they must be un-
derstood in light of its justified efforts to gain a better
hold over the metropolitan arena. The implementation
of the project, she argued, “is appropriate and necessary
at the local level given population increase and develop-
ment patterns of the city, and at the regional [metropoli-
tan] level, because of its national accessibility, as pointed
out in…its masterplan” (see RPI1).
Relatively, the project was planned such that it is con-
siderably larger—in both total size and area designated
for office use—than most other employment zones in
the region. Specifically, it was intended to surpass the
metro’s two most profitable zones, namely Atidim in Tel-
Aviv andGav-Yam in Herzliya (see Table 2). Both are pros-
perous and quickly expanding hubs, which host some of
the largest tech firms in the world, many of which are
well-known for their ground-breaking innovations in in-
formation technology, pharmaceuticals, media and com-
munication. The project’s location, one official claimed,
would facilitate “transfer of businesses from Tel-Aviv to
Rishon” (see CH4 in the Appendix, p. 231), and enable
the city to become a “powerful hub…that [would] com-
petewith employment areas in Tel-Aviv or Herzliya” (PI3).
The chief architect similarly declared: “In the future, it
[the project] will attract from Rishon and nearby areas,
meaning [it will] change the metropolitan picture” (see
PI4 in the Appendix).
Beyond size and location, the project was to attract
‘creative’ firms (and professionals) associated with eco-
nomically successful cities (Florida, 2002). In this spirit,
the planning team was determined to entice prestigious
firms in high-value economic sectors, including finance,
insurance, and information technology (see CH6 in the
Appendix). This, as noted above, stood in sharp con-
trast to the type of jobs the city attracted historically,
including light industry, retail, and wholesale. Indeed,
in the 1990s and 2000s, Rishon had the highest num-
ber of retail space per resident in the country and was
known as Israel’s “Mall Capital” (Ynet, 2018). The project
was to change its image. The change was recently de-
scribed as follows: “The city, which was, until recently,
Israel’s Mall capital is destined to become an alterna-
tive to Tel-Aviv, sweeping…not just headquarters of ma-
jor banks, butmany leading high-tech firms” (Ynet, 2018).
Similarly, one of the project’s largest land sale bid defines
to future landowners that “[new] modern offices will be
built…that [will] address the needs of high-tech firms and
enable them to draw clients from the entire [metropoli-
tan] region” (CH14 in the Appendix).
Metropolitan ambitions were also evident in the
project’s housing dimensions. Though the original plan
aimed to create a primarily employment zone, it gradu-
ally shifted into an all-out mixed-use scheme. Changes
had twofold motivations. First, from a planning per-
spective, adding a residential component, it was hoped,
would diversify its functionality, stimulate ‘round-the-
clock’ activities and distinguish the project from com-
parable, employment-oriented projects in neighboring
cities (e.g., Holon). Secondly, the project emerged
within the socio-political context of Israel’s 2011 so-
cial protest, which revolved primarily around the coun-
try’ so-called “housing crisis” (Charney, 2017). Against
this backdrop, the city was pressured by the District
Planning Committee to strengthen the project’s residen-
tial dimension, thereby help alleviating housing short-
ages (and rising prices) in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.
Consequently, while the original plan set the number
of residential units at 1,500, it had gradually increased
to 2,000 (in 2010), 2,500 (in 2014), 2,900 (in 2014),
4,900 (2015) and, finally, 5,500 (in 2016; see Table 1). In
the words of the chief architect: “We started out with
Table 1. Offices versus apartments: Changes during the planning process. Derived from CH1, CH5, CH9 and RPI2 in
the Appendix.
6.2009 7.2010 6.2014 2.2015 3.2016 4.2016
(CH2) (RZ/2030) (RPI2) (CH5) (CH10) (RZ/1000)
Offices Area (m2) 100,000 (Jobs) 1,750,000 1,750,000 Extra 13,652 1,750,00 1,750,000 (188,000 Jobs)
Apartments (units) 1,500 2,000–2,500 2,900 4,900 5,500* 4,900
Note: * Including 500 units from Ramat-Eliyaho to the 1000-District (transfer-plan).
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1,500…[that was] before 2011, but when we reached
the District [Planning] Committee, it was after…the so-
cial protest and the Chief Planner kept pushing us, 2,500
is not enough, raise it to 3,000, 3,500, and that’s how we
ended up with 5,000” (see PI3 in the Appendix).
In addition to their number, the District Planner de-
manded that future units be suited for different popula-
tions. Alongside the traditional, profit-maximizing large
units (120 square meters), advocated by the city, she re-
quired that smaller (70 square meters), more affordably
priced apartments are added (see RPI2 in the Appendix).
The latter were seen as vital for the attraction of socioe-
conomically strong groups, necessary for the creation
of a vibrant and productive urban community. As the
city’s Chief Planner explained, the main purpose was to
court specific groups: “We wanted IT professionals to
come [live] here and, eventually, work here because [it
is] such an innovative neighborhood. [They would] buy
apartments here…close to the beach and…[would] have
everything they need 24/7” (see PI3 in the Appendix).
Underscoring proximity to the beach and ‘round-the-
clock’ amenities was a calculated attempt to position the
city—and the project, more specifically—as viable alter-
natives to the free-spirited, beach-front urbanism that is
typically associatedwith Tel-Aviv, Israel’s world city in the
making (Kipnis, 2004).
Embracing a larger, more diverse residential compo-
nent was the result of both top-down, political pressures
and a growing realization that it was essential for the
attraction of so-called ‘quality populations.’ The latter
were perceived as critical for the success of the project
and for its ability to re-position the city as an upper-
middle class community at the southern edge of the
metropolitan area.
Nowhere were metropolitan aspirations more evi-
dent than in the strategic planning and marketing cam-
paign. By 2015, as the planning process was drawing
to an end, the city hired Aman, a Tel-Aviv-based firm
specializing in ‘smart’ urbanism to prepare a strategic
plan. Two international consulting firms had soon joined
in to assist in the preparation of the overarching plan.
Alongside ARUP, a world-renowned expert group “work-
ing across every aspect of today’s built environment”
(ARUP, 2019), Bechtel, a global engineering, construc-
tion and projectmanagement conglomeratewas subcon-
tracted. Assembling an international team, we were re-
peatedly told, was an early signpost that the city “was
setting the bar higher” (see PI3 in the Appendix).
The international team has soon shifted some of the
project’s core elements. One of its earliest recommen-
dations, for example, was to change the project’s name.
Originally titled the Dune Park after the sandy hills that
were characteristic of the city in its early days, it was re-
named the 1000-District. In Hebrew, HaElef means both
‘one thousand’ and ‘the millennium.’ The new name re-
flected the innovative, forward-looking nature of the
project, which the team sought to highlight. Explaining
the idea behind the new name, the chief architect noted:
Wemade every possible effort tomove away from the
image of a [traditional] employment zone…to create
an urban district experience….[We] needed to take a
name that…was partly stuck in the past—an industrial
park—and turn it into a [new] borough, an urban dis-
trict. (see PI4 in the Appendix)
Furthermore, to ensuremeeting international standards,
the team explored similar projects around the world.
Drawing on the experience of cities like London, Riyadh
and San Francisco, it has incorporated globally pop-
ular planning principles like walkability, gentrification-
mitigation strategies, and ‘green’ building codes (see CH4
and PI1 in the Appendix; see also Figure 3).
Nominal and conceptual changes were followed by
an intensive marketing campaign. Geared towards res-
idents of—and firms located in—the entire Tel-Aviv
metropolitan area, it involved circulation of brochures
and pamphlets, and advertisement in local, regional and
national outlets. In addition to traditional marketing
goals, namely enhancing project visibility (see CH10 in
the Appendix), the campaign aimed to solidify the im-
age of the city as a sub-metropolitan center. The costly
scheme utilized multiple mediums, from print and on-
line social networks (e.g., Facebook) to public billboards
and e-magazines, to re-position Rishon as a viable al-
ternative to Tel-Aviv. It is against this backdrop that
Mayor Tzur has recently called “on companies and en-
trepreneurs to become part of Israel’s new metropolis”
(Danieli, 2018), and a leading economic journal urged its
readers to “come invest in the future” because “once in a
millennium, a carefully planned new metropolis is born”
(Hirsh, 2019).
Rather than a project, or a compound, campaign
ads have consistently used the word ‘metropolis’ or
‘metropolitan area,’ producing as they may a new type
of discourse, which we term ‘metrotalk.’ The new dis-
course, we argue, draws on a new set of formations,
namely representation of knowledge about particular
objects (Foucault, 1980), which re-imagine the project—
and Rishon, more broadly—as the new centerpiece of
Table 2. Employment zones. Derived from HR/1900, TA/3561and RZ/1000 in the Appendix.
Size (dunams) Offices Space (square meters)
Atidim 346 250,000
Gav-Yam 650 725,000
1000-District 1000 1,750,000
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Figure 3. 2010 Local Needs Plan versus 2016 Metropolitan Plan. Derived from CH5, CH6 and CH11 in the Appendix.
the wider urban assemblage. By underlining its physi-
cal centrality and extensive transportational and logis-
tical linkages with the entire metro area, it sought to
convince (residential and commercial) out-of-towners,
that a new urban, indeed metropolitan, geography with
Rishon at its core, is well underway. Thus, for instance,
ads posted on the user-friendly website 1000muni in-
sisted that there were very few reasons to commute
to Tel-Aviv because the 1000-District is “a diverse, ex-
citing metropolis at the center of the country, which
offers accessibility and…flexibility…and simultaneously
saves its residents and employees the dreariness of con-
ventional employment parks and the suffering of traf-
fic jams” (1000muni, 2019). The website also features a
short video (titled 1000 in the Center), which mocks Tel-
Aviv’s centrality, asking defiantly: “Being at the center is
great; but what’s it worth, if it’s incredibly difficult to get
there?” (1000muni, 2019).
In one of the most ambitious public campaigns seen
in Israel, humongous billboards were deployed through-
out Tel Aviv and neighboring cities (Figure 3). Located pri-
marily around main metropolitan arteries, billboards in-
cluded a daring slogan, which challenged Tel Aviv’s po-
sition as the only metropolitan hub, calling the project
“a new core center for the metropolitan area.” The witty
message was invariably echoed in speeches and inter-
views conducted with city officials. One of the major real
estate developers in the project, for instance, quoted
competitive rents, low tax rates and easy access from the
entire metropolitan area as the main motivations for the
relocation of Tel Aviv-based firms to Rishon. Similarly, Raz
Kinstlich, the recently elected Mayor, claimed that the
majority of employees in Tel-Aviv are in fact residents of
the metro’s southern cities and would therefore “prefer
to work in Rishon” (see CH14 in the Appendix).
In line with its plan to re-position Rishon within the
metro area, the city has been aggressively pursuing sec-
tors that have long been associatedwith Tel-Aviv, namely
banking and insurance. Initial efforts have been quite suc-
cessful, as the first several bidswerewon by the Discount
Bank Group and Migdal—Israel’s largest insurance cor-
poration (Hashikma Rishon-Lezion, 2019). And, while it
is still early to predict whether these are early signposts
of success in re-structuring the (economic) geography of
the Tel-Aviv area, it is clear that the project is stirring
metropolitan relations in quite a different direction.
6. Conclusion
The article examines how a LUD project whose original
purpose was to address challenges at the city-scale be-
came —in the course of the planning process—a means
to attain goals at the metropolitan scale. Using the 1000-
District in the second-tier Israeli city of Rishon as a
case study, it explored how the project, conceived to
mitigate local employment shortages, has gradually be-
come a springboard for metropolitan re-positioning of
the city. Focusing on project’s employment and housing
dimensions, as well as its marketing campaign, we ar-
gued that planning a disproportionately large number of
jobs, and agglomerating them in a single, massive and
highly-accessible site was intended to endow the city
with higher-order urban qualities and, consequently, po-
sition it as a viable sub-metropolitan center that is capa-
ble of competing with other existing sub-centers and the
core city itself.
With respect to housing, initial resistance to residen-
tial units had gradually faded, as the city was pressured—
professionally and politically—to plan a mixed-use
scheme that would draw residents and customers from
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across the metropolitan area. Subsequently, a power-
ful marketing campaign was initiated that centered on
the innovative qualities of the project, emphasizing its
metropolitan ambitions. Utilizing ‘metrotalk,’ a set of nar-
ratives that re-imagine the project, and the city, as a po-
tential sub-center of the wider metropolitan area, it un-
derlined their physical centrality and extensive linkages
with other cities. In doing so, it sought to convince resi-
dential and commercial entities that a newmetropolitan
geography with Rishon at its core is being formed.
The article makes three important contributions to
the literature on LUD projects. First, in contrast to much
of the literature, which examines their impact at the
regional, national and global scales, we focus on their
metropolitan implications. The metropolitan scale is im-
portant because large projects are key tools in contem-
porary inter-urban competition, which is increasingly
waged between adjacent cities in the same urban ag-
glomeration. As we have shown, the 1000-District was
used instrumentally to advance Rishon’s status and pres-
tige in relation to a range of cities in the metropolitan
area. In addition to the core city of Tel-Aviv, which the
project intended to draw residents, workers and firms
from, other secondary cities, including Herzliya, Holon
and Bat-Yam were to be adversely affected by it, mostly
economically. The objection of the latter, though un-
successful, was especially significant because it signaled
the sense of threat experienced by nearby cities in the
context of intra-metropolitan fragmentation. Yet, the
fragmented nature of Israel’s main metropolitan area is
hardly unique. Indeed, since many city-regions are being
carved up into multiple, smaller urban fractions, many
aspiring for their own grandiose projects, assessing their
implications for the entire metro is of imminent impor-
tance. Future studies should scrutinize these negative
implications more closely, including the mechanisms to
moderate them.
Second, while the majority of studies have looked at
large-scale projects planned and implemented in global
cities, or city-regions, our article focused on a second-
tier, non-core city within a metropolitan area. Focusing
on a secondary city is important not simply because it
is smaller in size or located lower in the urban hierar-
chy, but primarily because these qualities present it with
major challenges in planning and implementing a large
urban project. As the case of Rishon demonstrates, sec-
ondary cities facedwith the physical, financial and institu-
tional complexity of such projects, are not only required
to mobilize considerable resources, but simultaneously
face key hurdles in their dealings with planning stake-
holders at different scales. From concerns about the eco-
nomic repercussions it might have on adjacent, less well-
off cities to difficulties in fending off district-level plan-
ning regulations, smaller cities are often less equipped—
economically, politically, and administratively—to han-
dle the acute pressures that emanate from the erec-
tion of large projects. Hence, given the steadily increas-
ing number of secondary cities (in Israel and beyond)
who embark on such projects, future studies should pay
closer attention to these unique difficulties and, where
possible, devise urban strategies to mitigate them.
Finally, the article underlines the importance of dis-
course in LUD projects. The role of discourse in urban
planning has long been acknowledged (Tett & Wolfe,
1991), but for reasons that are beyond this article, it re-
ceived relatively little attention in the context of large-
scale development. However, since re-positioning a city
is as much a material process as it is discursive, we
attended, however briefly, to the ways in which the
1000-District was constructed as a metropolitan project.
Especially during the marketing phase, the project—and
the city—were portrayed as the new metropolitan core.
Taking on Tel-Aviv is an ambitious plan and, given its en-
trenched status as Israel’s financial, commercial and cul-
tural powerhouse, no one project could realistically pre-
tend to accomplish it. Yet, Rishon’s ‘metrotalk’ should
be seen as a strategic discourse, which attempts to re-
position it within themetropolitan grid. Further research
will tell whether the project had lived up to its promise
“to change the map of Gush Dan [Tel-Aviv metropolitan
area]” (1000muni, 2019).
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